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Summary. –– Existing studies analyzing the so-called ‘resource curse’ hypothesis 
regress growth in gross domestic product (GDP) on some measure of resource-intensity. 
This is problematic as GDP counts natural and other capital depreciation as income. 
Deducting depreciation from GDP to arrive at genuine income, we test whether the 
‘curse’ still holds true. We find supporting evidence, but the growth disadvantage of 
resource-intensive economies is slightly weaker in terms of genuine income than GDP. 
We suggest that this provides additional, but somewhat weak and limited, evidence in 
support of those who argue that the ‘curse’ is partly due to unsustainable over-
consumption. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Being richly endowed with natural resources can threaten a country’s long-term 
prosperity as natural resource-intensive economies grow slower over time than 
economies that are less natural resource-intensive. Sachs and Warner (1995a) were not 
the first one to note this paradoxical result,
1 but their paper spurred an extensive and still 
growing literature aimed at explaining what drives this result (e.g., Mikesell, 1997; Auty 
and Mikesell, 1998; Ross, 1999; Auty, 2001; Manzano and Rigobon 2001; Isham et al., 
2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).
2 These studies offer a diverse set of 
explanations covering, amongst others, terms of trade effect, dutch disease, debt 
overhang, institutional quality and other political economy arguments. Others 
questioned the robustness of the result with respect to changes in the definition of 
natural resource-intensity (e.g., Stijns, 2001a) and the econometric estimator used (e.g., 
Manzano and Rigobon, 2001) or observed that in terms of income levels (rather than 
growth) natural resource-intensive economies on average fare better rather than worse 
(e.g., Davis, 1995; Mikesell, 1997; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999). 
In this article, we do not seek to explain the so-called ‘resource curse’ directly. 
Neither do we seek to test whether the ‘curse’ still holds for competing definitions of 
resource intensity or alternative estimation techniques. Instead, this paper’s original 
contribution is in examining whether the ‘curse’, as postulated by Sachs and Warner 
(1995a, 1997), holds true for measures of genuine or true income as well. This is 
important because GDP is a particularly erroneous measure of income for resource-
intensive economies. 
Existing studies look at growth in real gross domestic product (GDP). Of course, it 
is well known that GDP contains an element of depreciation of produced capital that 
should not be counted as income. It would therefore be more correct to analyze growth 
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in real net domestic product (NDP) where depreciation of produced capital has been 
subtracted from GDP. This is typically not done for two reasons. First, the depreciation 
term is estimated based on simplifying (and contestable) assumptions and, more 
importantly, for most countries it makes very little difference whether one looks at GDP 
or NDP. This holds true whether or not economies are intensive in natural resources. 
Things are different, however, when one starts taking into account depreciation of 
natural capital as well. Not only can depreciation terms be of significant size, but also 
depreciation tends to be higher for economies that are intensive in natural resources than 
for others that are not. With the accounting method for natural capital depreciation 
described below the correction to GDP can be as high as 30 per cent. There can 
therefore be a substantial gap between gross income and what one might want to call 
genuine income, that is GDP minus the depreciation of produced and natural capital, 
and the size of the gap is partly determined by the resource-intensity of economies. 
There is therefore a problem with the existing studies examining the ‘resource curse’ as 
they analyze growth in GDP instead of growth in true or genuine income. 
This article therefore tests whether the ‘resource curse’ holds true for growth in 
genuine income as well and, if so, whether the negative effect of natural resource-
intensity on growth is over- or under-estimated by erroneously examining growth in 
GDP. To our knowledge, no other study has ever done this. Winter-Nelson (1995) 
computes what he calls environmentally adjusted income for 18 African resource 
exporters, but he merely demonstrates that a strategy of export expansion has led to 
growth in GDP, but not growth in environmentally adjusted income. He therefore does 
not test for the ‘resource curse’ itself. Also, his sample size is of course very small. 
Mikesell (1997, p. 195) suggests that if GDP was adjusted for natural capital 
depreciation, then the ‘resource curse’ would be even stronger over the period 1980 to 
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1993. However, he does not validate his suggestion with any general empirical test, 
instead referring to Repetto et al.’s (1989) single country study of Indonesia, in which 
adjusted income grew slower over the period 1971 to 1984 than GDP. Indeed, we will 
show that the exact opposite to Mikesell’s suggestion is actually the case as the 
‘resource curse’ is slightly weaker in terms of growth of genuine income than growth of 
GDP.
3 Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) examine whether negative genuine savings rates 
(gross investment minus depreciation of produced and natural capital divided by GDP) 
can explain the ‘resource curse’, but they do not examine whether the ‘curse’ holds for 
growth in genuine income. 
 
2. EXPLAINING THE ‘RESOURCE CURSE’ 
How can the blessing of an extra endowment with natural resources turn into a curse? A 
priori this represents a puzzle, even a paradox. Following Auty (2001) one can 
distinguish ‘exogenous’ from ‘internal’ explanations for the poor growth performance 
of natural resource-intensive economies. Revenue volatility and a long-term declining 
trend in the terms of trade of resource exporters represent explanation attempts that can 
be derived from structuralist economic theory à la Prebisch (1950). The Dutch disease 
phenomenon is another and one of the most frequently cited exogenous explanations. It 
refers to the decline in the productivity and competitiveness of the manufacturing and 
other tradeables sector following the real exchange rate appreciation in the wake of a 
resource boom. This represents a problem if the manufacturing and other tradeables 
sector is characterized by economies of scale (Gelb and associates, 1988; Sachs and 
Warner, 2001). The exogenous explanations leave little space for policy makers to avoid 
the problem. In comparison, the internal explanations of the ‘resource curse’ all lay the 
blame squarely at bad policies. A link between the two is given by the fact that the 
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manufacturing and other tradeables sector becomes damaged not only by dutch disease, 
but also by misguided industrial policies in the form of protectionist barriers for import-
substitution, which has been typical for many natural resource-intensive economies. 
Indeed, some studies show that the main problem of resource booms was to allow 
resource-intensive economies to sustain economically harmful policies longer than less 
resource-intensive economies that started out with similarly unproductive policies (e.g., 
Auty 1993, 1994). More importantly, resource abundance might lead to a rentier 
economy with a predatory state: corruption, political conflict and inequalities are 
rampant, economic institutions are poorly developed, human capital accumulation, 
entrepeneurship and innovative activity are crowded out and policy makers are more 
interested in resource transfers than developing and modernizing the country’s economy 
(Lal and Myint, 1996; Gylfason, 2001; Auty, 2001; Isham et al., 2003).
4
Two studies have emphasized the problem that natural resource abundance allows 
countries to engage in excessive consumption that is not sustainable into the future. We 
will concentrate on these two studies as our empirical analysis provides some, but 
limited, evidence in their favor. Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) employ a Ramsey growth 
model and a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model of the Venezuelan economy 
to argue that economies rich in natural resources are likely to live beyond their means. 
Indicative of this is that resource-intensive economies, whilst growing slower than less 
resource-intensive ones, also tend to have higher absolute income levels – a point 
demonstrated by Rodríguez and Sachs (1999), but already pointed out by others (e.g., 
Davis, 1995; Mikesell, 1997). In the transition to the steady state, the resource 
endowment allows the country to afford extraordinary consumption possibilities derived 
from unsustainably high income levels. In other words, ‘a resource rich economy will 
adjust to its steady state from above, not from below’ (Rodríguez and Sachs, 2003, p. 4). 
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During the transition it might display negative growth rates in GDP on average. With 
exogenous productivity growth it might escape negative growth rates, but in any case 
growth rates will be lower than if the country did not live on unsustainable income 
levels beyond its means. Theoretically, the problem could be circumvented if the 
resource-intensive economy invests its resource rents in international assets paying 
permanent annuities. However, if there are restrictions on investment abroad or a 
preference for investing domestically, then these economies will experience 
consumption booms that are unsustainable in the long run. Of course, on a very 
fundamental level it is not clear that such consumption booms are completely irrational 
and undesirable. Even a rational inter-temporal social welfare maximizer might want to 
use some of the windfall gains from resource booms to raise initial consumption levels. 
This is because the marginal utility of consumption in these economies is likely to be 
very high and if exogenous productivity growth can be expected then the windfalls can 
also be used to smooth the inter-temporal consumption path. 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) provide an argument similar to Rodríguez and Sachs 
(1999) together with corroborating evidence from cross-sectional growth in GDP 
regressions. They argue that resource-intensive countries, defined as countries with a 
high share of natural capital depreciation relative to GDP, are likely to have excessive 
consumption fuelled by the windfalls of natural resource extraction. Their regressions 
show that the interaction of large resource rents with government consumption is 
associated with lower growth. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) also find that natural 
resource-intensity in economies with negative genuine savings rates is associated with a 
growth rate that is statistically significantly below zero. Natural resource-intensity in 
economies with a positive genuine savings rate is also estimated to have a negative 
coefficient, but it is not statistically significant.
5 Furthermore, whilst Sachs and Warner 
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(1997) did not find evidence that resource-intensity is associated with lower gross 
savings and investment rates, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) on the whole find a 
negative correlation between natural resource-intensity and genuine savings rates. 
Gylfason and Zoega (2002) find a similar link between investment and savings rates on 
one hand and resource abundance on the other hand, where resource abundance is 
defined as the share of natural capital in total national wealth. 
Let us turn to a discussion on how one should account for natural capital 
depreciation and the implications of such accounting for the ‘resource curse’. 
 
3. ACCOUNTING FOR NATURAL CAPITAL DEPRECIATION 
Resource economists have studied the importance of as well as methods for accounting 
for natural capital depreciation at least since Hartwick’s (1977) influential paper. There 
he showed that under certain circumstances economies, which extract a non-renewable 
resource, can only maintain their consumption levels over time if they invest the full 
resource rents into produced capital. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s accounting for 
natural capital depreciation has figured prominently in natural resource economics as 
part of the sustainable development research agenda (El Serafy, 1981, 1989; Repetto et 
al., 1989; Serôa da Motta and Young, 1995). 
That the GDP of natural resource-intensive economies does not reflect their genuine 
income levels has not escaped the early attention of affected countries either. For 
example, Shihata (1982, p. 202), then Director-General of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Development Fund, notes that the income of 
the Arab oil-exporting economies ‘is in reality a cash exchange for a depletable natural 
resource’. OPEC itself commissioned a study in 1984, which opens with a sentence of 
admirable clarity: ‘The GDP of oil-exporting states is exaggerated because some of their 
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“income” is due to the consumption of depletable oil resources and hence is liquidation 
of capital, not income’ (Stauffer and Lennox, 1984, p. 6). 
Unfortunately, how best to account for natural capital depreciation is heavily 
debated and no consensus has emerged in the relevant literature (Hartwick and 
Hageman, 1993; El Serafy, 1981, 1989; Vincent, 1997; Santopietro, 1998). It does have 
a very simple answer, however, as long as one assumes that economies are competitive 
and inter-temporally efficient (Hartwick and Hageman, 1993; Hamilton, 1996; 
Neumayer, 2003). In this framework natural capital depreciation is equal to total 
Hotelling (1931) rent: 
 
(1)     R MC P ⋅ − ) (
 
where P is the resource price, MC is marginal cost and R is resource extraction. In 
the case of a renewable resource, R would be resource harvesting beyond natural 
regeneration. One of the major difficulties of applying this theoretically correct method 
in reality is that data on marginal cost are frequently unavailable. Average cost data are 
more available. Most studies applying this method have therefore replaced marginal 
cost with the more readily available average costs and calculated depreciation according 
to the following formula: 
 
(2)   ( ) PA CR − ⋅  
 
A popular alternative has been what is known as the El Serafy (1981, 1989) method: 
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where r is the discount rate and n is the number of remaining years of the resource 
stock. For simplicity, n is often set equal to the static reserves to production ratio, which 
is the number of years the reserve stock would last if production was the same in the 
future as in the base year. If r > 0 and n > 0, then (3) will produce a smaller depreciation 
term for resource extraction than (2). 
Equation (3) is also called the ‘user cost’ of resource extraction since it indicates the 
share of resource receipts that should be considered as capital depreciation. The formula 
for the El Serafy method is derived from the following reasoning: receipts from non-
renewable resource extraction should not fully count as what El Serafy calls ‘sustainable 
income’ because resource extraction leads to a lowering of the resource stock and thus 
brings with it an element of depreciation of the resource capital stock.
6 Whilst the 
receipts from the resource stock will end at some finite time, ‘sustainable income’ by 
definition must last forever. Hence, ‘sustainable income’ is defined as that part of 
resource receipts which if received infinitely would have a present value just equal to 
the present value of the finite stream of resource receipts over the life-time of the 
resource. Natural capital depreciation is then the difference between resource rents and 
‘sustainable income’. Appendix 1 shows why this reasoning leads to equation (3). 
Hartwick and Hageman (1993) show that the El Serafy method can be understood 
as an approximation to equation (1), which to repeat represents the theoretically correct 
depreciation in a framework of a competitive inter-temporally efficient economy. Its 
main advantage over the World Bank method in equation (2) is that the El Serafy 
method can use average cost without apology as it does not depend on marginal cost. 
The World Bank method, on the other hand, needs to replace marginal cost with average 
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cost as marginal cost is not readily available. Due to the replacement of marginal with 
average cost it can also merely represent an approximation to the theoretically correct 
method. Which of the two methods creates the greater bias is therefore not clear in 
general. Under certain assumptions about the resource extraction cost function, the two 
methods can be shown to be two polar cases of the true depreciation value and the bias 
depends on the elasticity of the marginal cost curve with respect to the quantity 
extracted (Vincent, 1997; Serôa da Motta and Ferraz do Amaral, 2000). 
In this study, we will use the method given by (2). The main reason is that reliable 
reserve data of natural resources are difficult to get hold of.
7 Additionally, as long as 
known reserves last for less than or little more than 20 years or so, which typically holds 
true for many resource-intensive economies, and the discount rate is significantly below 
5 per cent, then the difference between (2) and (3) is not that large (Atkinson and 
Hamilton, 2003). To show this, table 1 plots for various values of n and r the difference 
between (2) and (3) for a natural capital depreciation value of $100 according to (2). A 
low discount rate can be justified on the grounds that it is highly uncertain whether the 
alternative investments that are supposed to provide an infinite stream of income can be 
expected to generate a high rate of return. An additional justification for using (2) is that 
unexpected developments such as breakthroughs in the price of substitute backstop 
technologies can hugely decrease the value of large reserve stocks and the longer the 
stock lasts in the future the more uncertainty there is. 
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
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4. ACCOUNTING FOR NATURAL CAPITAL DEPRECIATION 
AND THE ‘RESOURCE CURSE’ 
With (2) as the formula for computing natural capital depreciation, how is the growth 
performance in genuine income levels likely to differ from the growth performance in 
GDP? Ceteris paribus, the ‘resource curse’ is stronger (weaker) in terms of growth of 
genuine income than growth in GDP if the start period depreciation term relative to 
GDP is smaller (bigger) than the end period depreciation term relative to GDP. This of 
course depends on the depreciation term in the start period compared to the end period 
of analysis, but it also depends on their sizes relative to the respective GDP levels from 
the two periods. Recall that the depreciation term is (P-AC)·R. Average extraction levels 
tend to have risen between 1970 and 1998. For extraction costs, the trend is very much 
resource- and country-specific. Prices of resources have also not trended uniformly over 
this period as table 2 shows.
8  
 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
Some prices like that of oil, the most important component of natural capital 
depreciation in value terms, and gold have gone up, whereas the price of many others 
have fallen. This already implies that a priori it is not clear whether accounting for 
natural capital depreciation weakens or strengthens the ‘resource curse’. However, 
because what matters is the size of (P-AC)·R relative to GDP levels, the impact of 
accounting for natural capital depreciation on the ‘resource curse’ gets even more 
complex. One therefore needs to employ theory to arrive at a more informed prior 
expectation about the strength of the ‘resource curse’ in terms of growth of genuine 
income compared to GDP growth. It is here that Rodríguez and Sachs’s (1999) and 
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Atkinson and Hamilton’s (2003) arguments are informative. If it is true that resource-
intensive economies have excessive consumption spurred by unsustainably high GDP 
levels, then the growth performance in genuine income levels should be better than the 
growth performance in GDP, which is boosted by unsustainable resource extraction. 
This is because genuine income levels are corrected for depreciation of natural capital. 
They take out the unsustainable parts of GDP. It follows that one can expect the 
‘resource curse’, if it exists at all, to be weaker in terms of growth of genuine income 
than growth of GDP. It is this hypothesis we are going to test now. 
 
5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To demonstrate clearly the effect of natural resource-intensity on growth in genuine 
income rather than growth in GDP we use Sachs and Warner’s (1997) original data set 
with amendments. We briefly describe the variables used here, but appendix 2 also 
provides detailed and more precise variable definitions and states the sources of data. 
Maloney (2001, p. 1) criticizes Sachs and Warner’s (1997) results on the ground that 
‘growth processes take place across the very long run and probably cannot be 
convincingly summarized by cross section regressions of one highly turbulent 20 year 
period at the end of the 20
th century’. Unfortunately, no data on natural capital 
depreciation exist before 1970 so that we cannot extend the period of analysis 
backwards. However, since we have now access to more updated data, we no longer 
restrict the analysis to the period 1970 to 1990, but extend it to 1998 making use of the 
latest update of the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten 2002). 
Like Sachs and Warner (1997) we start with regressing the average annual growth 
rate in GDP over the period 1970 to 1998 (GROWTH7098) on the log of initial GDP per 
capita (LGDP70) and the variable of natural resource-intensity. For our measure of 
13 
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natural resource-intensity we follow Sachs and Warner and use their measure of the 
share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970 (RESOURCE70).
9 Primary 
products consist of agricultural products, minerals and energy resources. Following the 
structure of Sachs and Warner’s (1997) basic regressions, we then add their measure of 
trade openness (OPEN7090). Unfortunately, this variable could not be updated to 1998. 
In consequent regressions follow the log of the average gross investment to GDP ratio 
(LINV7098), a measure capturing the average extent of the rule of law (RULELAW8295) 
and the average annual growth in the log of the external terms of trade between 1970 
and 1998 (TTGROWTH7098). The rule of law variable is not publicly available, but has 
been provided for the better part of the period of this study free of charge courtesy of 
Political Risk Services. Note that this variable does not exist before 1982 so that the 
extent of the rule of law is averaged over the period 1982 to 1995. We then repeat the 
set of regressions with growth in genuine income as the dependent variable 
(GENGROWTH7098) and replace LGDP70 with the log of the initial genuine income 
level (LGENINC70).
10
Like Sachs and Warner (1997) we exclude outliers from the sample applying 
Belsley  et al.’s (1980) criterion. An outlier is an observation with a DFITS that is 
greater in absolute terms than twice the square root of (k/n), where k is the number of 
independent variables and n the number of observations, and where DFITS is defined as 
the square root of (hi/(1-hi)), where hi is an observation’s leverage, multiplied by its 
studentized residual. Applying this criterion excludes Botswana, Gabon, Malaysia, 
Rwanda and Zambia from the sample. However, like in Sachs and Warner (1997) the 
main results uphold if these countries are not excluded. 
We take the values of produced and natural capital depreciation from the World 
Bank’s data set on genuine savings, also called adjusted net savings, published on the 
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Bank’s website and available as part of the annual World Development Indicators on 
CD-Rom.
11 Clearly, depreciation of both produced and natural capital should be taken 
into account, but non-reported sensitivity analysis showed that natural capital 
depreciation is the main driver of the results reported below. 
The World Bank takes data on the depreciation of produced capital from estimates 
undertaken by the United Nations Statistics Division. With respect to natural capital 
depreciation, the World Bank data set includes three categories of natural resources, 
namely energy, minerals and forestry. Energy consists of oil, gas and coal, whereas 
minerals encompass bauxite, copper, iron ore, lead, nickel, phosphate rock, tin, zinc, 
gold and silver. Forestry refers to the production of fuelwood, coniferous softwood, 
non-coniferous softwood and tropical hardwood.
12 For minerals, (P-AC), or unit rent, is 
computed as the world price of the resource minus mining, milling, benefication, 
smelting and transportation to port costs minus a ‘normal’ return to capital. For oil, gas 
and coal, unit rent is the world price minus lifting costs. For some resources, such as 
natural gas, where, strictly speaking, there is no single world price, a shadow world 
price is computed as the average free-on-board price from several points of export. For 
forestry, unit rent is calculated as the world price for each category of wood minus 
average unit production costs. This is multiplied by the amount of wood production 
exceeding the natural increment.  
Inevitably, there are some problems with the data. For example, the use of uniform 
world prices overstates somewhat natural capital depreciation for countries with lower-
grade resource deposits. The use of average rather than marginal costs also tends to 
over-estimate depreciation. Both prices and extraction costs often need to be estimated. 
Extraction costs are sometimes only available for a region rather than countries and only 
for a number of years, which means that missing values need to be interpolated. 
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Furthermore, for lack of data the World Bank’s computations of natural capital 
depreciation do not cover such items as depletion of fish stocks and water resources and 
the erosion of topsoil. This together with natural capital depletion being computed by 
the net price instead of the user cost method (see section 3 above) implies that the 
natural capital depreciation of mineral and fossil fuel extracting economies is somewhat 
biased upwards relative to that of other economies.
13 These caveats notwithstanding, the 
data set represents the most ambitious and comprehensive attempt yet at estimating the 
value of natural capital depreciation. 
 
6. RESULTS 
Columns 1a to 5a of table 3 repeat the basic cross-country growth regressions of 
columns 1 to 5 of table 1 in Sachs and Warner (1997), the only difference being that we 
examine growth over the period 1970 to 1998 rather than 1990. Column 1 includes only 
the log of initial GDP and the primary exports variable. In the consequent four columns, 
Sachs and Warner’s measure of trade openness, the logged investment rate, the index of 
the extent of the rule of law and the average annual growth in the log of the external 
terms of trade are added. Extending the period to 1998 does not change the fundamental 
result of Sachs and Warner’s (1997) analysis for the period 1970 to 1990 only: Natural 
resource-intensive economies grow slower. The estimated coefficients for the variable 
of natural resource-intensity are somewhat smaller, ranging between 3.50 and 5.57 
rather than 6.96 and 10.57. This suggests that natural resource economies did relatively 
better in the 1990s compared to the two decades before. However, the ‘resource curse’ 
still holds true and the estimated coefficients are still of substantial size as we will see 
below. A ten percentage points increase in RESOURCE70 lowers the growth rate of 
GDP by about .35 to .56 percentage points. Similar to Sachs and Warner (1997) there is 
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a positive link between growth on the one hand and trade openness and the investment 
share on the other hand. The terms-of-trade variable is insignificant. Contrary to Sachs 
and Warner (1997) I do not find the rule of law variable to be significant in columns 
(4a) and (5a). However, I use period-averaged data whereas Sachs and Warner use the 
1982 value only, which is not representative over a period of almost 30 years. Columns 
1b to 5b repeat the analysis for the growth performance in genuine income levels. 
Results are generally rather similar. In particular, the ‘resource curse’ clearly exists in 
terms of growth of genuine income as well. 
 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
 
What is discernible from the results reported in table 3 is that the coefficients of 
RESOURCE70 are always smaller in the regressions with GENGROWTH7098 than with 
GROWTH7098 as the dependent variable. In other words, the ‘resource curse’ is not as 
strong in genuine income as in GDP. However, the difference in the estimated 
coefficients is rather small. Table 4 reports results testing whether the differences in the 
coefficients are statistically significant. For the first three regressions we can reject the 
hypothesis of equality of coefficients at the 10 per cent significance level (but not at the 
5 per cent level). In regression 4 we marginally fail to reject and in regression 5 we fail 
to reject more clearly the hypothesis at the 10 per cent level. Furthermore, one might 
want to take into account that the distributions of the two dependent variables are not 
the same. Table 4 therefore also reports beta coefficients, which show by how many 
standard deviations the dependent variable changes for a one standard deviation increase 
in the explanatory variable. A one standard deviation increase in RESOURCE70 is 
equivalent to an increase in the share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970 of 
17 
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about nine percentage points. This increase lowers the growth rate of GDP by between 
.21 and .34 standard deviations, whereas it lowers the growth rate of genuine income by 
between .19 and .31 standard deviations. This means that even in terms of genuine 
income growth the ‘resource curse’ still pertains and remains substantively important. 
When we test whether the differences in standardized beta coefficients are statistically 
significant, we find similar results to the tests for the non-standardized coefficients. 
Additionally, we marginally fail to reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients at the 
10 per cent level also in regression 1 now. 
 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
 
Let us illustrate the result that the ‘resource curse’ is not quite as strong in genuine 
income as in GDP by showing the growth performance in GDP versus growth in 
genuine income for the top and bottom 10 resource-intensive countries in our sample as 
measured by RESOURCE70 (table 5). The very resource-intensive countries on average 
have much lower GDP growth over the period 1970 to 1998 than the low resource-
intensive countries. However, on average their growth in genuine income is .06 
percentage points higher than their GDP growth, whereas the growth in genuine income 
of the 10 countries with the lowest resource-intensity is .12 percentage points lower than 
their GDP growth.
14 This illustrates nicely that the ‘resource curse’ is weaker in genuine 
income, but a substantial gap in growth performance between the two groups of 
countries pertains in genuine income as well. 
 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
 
18 
This version: May 2004 
7. CONCLUSION 
Our results can be summarized in two main propositions. First, natural resource-
intensive countries really do suffer from a ‘resource curse’. Existing studies have failed 
to take into account natural capital depreciation and have analyzed growth of the wrong 
term, namely GDP, instead of genuine income. In fact, looking at genuine income 
instead reinforces the robustness of the evidence in favor of the ‘resource curse’. 
Resource-intensive economies grow slower than their less resource-intensive peers in 
terms of genuine income as well. Second, however, contrary to Mikesell’s (1997) 
suggestion, the ‘resource curse’ is weaker in terms of growth of genuine income than 
growth of GDP. Yet, the difference is small and in some estimations we cannot be sure 
that it is statistically significantly different from zero. This therefore provides additional, 
but somewhat weak and limited, evidence in support of those like Rodríguez and Sachs 
(1999) and Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) who try to explain the poor performance of 
natural resource-intensive economies with reference to unsustainable over-consumption. 
For natural resource-intensive economies, GDP levels erroneously signal a level of 
income that is beyond the sustainable level. It induces policy makers to engage in 
excessive consumption and the country as a whole to living beyond its means. Genuine 
income corrects GDP for what is truly capital depreciation rather than income. Once this 
correction is done, we find that the ‘resource curse’ still holds, but it is weaker – as it 
should be if unsustainable over-consumption is part of the explanation of the ‘curse’. 
From the fact that the ‘resource curse’ still upholds if the growth performance is 
measured in terms of genuine income levels and that the difference in estimated 
coefficients is small and sometimes not statistically significantly different from zero 
follows that explanations other than unsustainable over-consumption are required to 
account for the bulk of the poor growth performance of natural resource-intensive 
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economies. Explaining the ‘resource curse’ therefore remains an important task for 
future research by natural resource and development scholars. 
What are the policy implications of our findings? Surely, leaving resources in the 
ground is no solution. Rather, the challenge is to ensure that the revenues from natural 
resource extraction are put to more productive use and the genuine savings rate is raised. 
But how to achieve this? Discussing these issues thoroughly is beyond the scope of the 
present article, so we will merely sketch some possibilities here without discussing their 
merits and feasibility in any detail. Prudent fiscal policy, perhaps coupled with a natural 
resource fund, can help to stabilize and sterilize some of the revenues. Multilateral 
donors like the World Bank can require lenders to use some of the revenues for public 
sector investment in health and education for the people rather than military and other 
wasteful expenditures. This has been one of the major conclusions of the Bank’s 
Extractive Industries Review (EIR), which was prompted by criticism from civil society 
of the Bank’s role in financing natural resource projects (http://www.eireview.org).
15 
Some of the government-owned funds could be redistributed to citizens if governments 
cannot be trusted to use the funds wisely. Careful exchange rate management can 
mitigate the negative effects of resource booms on other sectors. Together these 
measures could help stimulating investment in and diversification of the private sector. 
However, these measures are of course difficult to achieve in countries plagued by poor 
governance and bad institutional quality, which is typically the case in countries 
affected by the ‘resource curse’. It is for this reason that in my view the political 
economy approach that attempts to explain the poor growth performance with the 
negative impact of natural resource wealth on the state of governance and institutional 
quality represents the most promising path. On this aspect, Dietz, Neumayer and De 
Soysa (2004) show that improving the quality of governance, particularly with respect 
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to corruption, reduces the negative impact of natural resource abundance on genuine 
savings. Whilst not directly addressing the resource curse, these findings point toward 
the importance of interaction effects between resource abundance and measures of 
institutional quality. 
In terms of future research, it would be worth while exploring using other model 
specifications with growth in genuine income as the dependent variable. For example, 
Stijns (2001a) and others have criticized Sachs and Warner’s (1997) measure of natural 
resource intensity. Indeed, in using this measure there is a certain circularity in 
argument since countries which successfully grow will reach a higher level of income 
and therefore have a smaller natural resource exports to income ratio. Another problem 
is that, depending on the country, the share of agriculture relative to minerals and fossil 
fuels can be high in Sachs and Warner’s (1997) measure, whereas the ‘resource curse’ 
refers almost exclusively to mineral and fossil fuel extraction. It would be worthwhile 
exploring alternative indicators of resource intensity, for example, a mineral and fossil 
fuel rent indicator derived from the World Bank (2003) source used here to compute 
genuine income. It would also be worth while checking if the ‘resource curse’ in 
genuine income holds for alternative estimation techniques. Tackling these issues is 
beyond the present paper’s scope, however. 
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1 See, for example, Gelb and associates (1988) and Auty (1993). 
2 See Stevens (2003) for a survey. 
3 Also note that Roemer (1994) and others argue that Indonesia actually managed its oil 
boom quite well via competent exchange rate management and a shift from inward-
looking to outward-looking policies. 
4 Note, however, that Stijns (2001b) shows that if resource abundance is measured as 
natural resource rents per capita, then economies with resource abundance do not have 
lower education expenditures per capita. 
5 Unfortunately, they do not report whether the negative growth effect of a low genuine 
savings rate is stronger or weaker in resource intensive relative to resource poor 
countries. 
6 The same reasoning applies to renewable resources if harvesting exceeds natural 
regeneration. 
7 Neumayer (2000) is one of the very few studies applying the El Serafy method for a 
range of countries. 
8 Cuddington (1992) similarly finds non-uniformity in trends of 26 primary commodity 
prices over the much longer period 1900 to 1983. 
9 A reviewer wondered whether this variable and the LINV7098 variable described 
further below should be altered in the estimations with growth in genuine income as the 
dependent variable such that in their denominator GNP or GDP is replaced with genuine 
income. However, this is not done here since the numerator of these variables is not 
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adjusted either. For example, the value of primary commodity exports is not adjusted 
for natural capital depreciation and no sufficient data exist that would allow such 
adjustment. 
10 Such regressions are based on a neoclassical growth model. A reviewer raised the 
question whether such regressions apply to genuine income at all, given that the 
neoclassical growth model based on Solow (1956) assumes that a fixed share of national 
income, not of genuine income, is saved and invested. To start with, there is nothing in 
the Solow model that prevents it from being broadened to other forms of capital than 
produced capital. Pender (1998), for example, includes natural capital in such a model. 
Furthermore, the steady-state level in the Solow growth model is at the intersection of 
investment and depreciation. Taking natural capital depreciation into account could 
therefore be understood as raising depreciation, which would lower the steady-state 
level of capital. 
11 The data can be downloaded from World Bank (2003). 
12 For details, see Bolt, Matete and Clemens (2002). 
13 It is not clear whether this bias considerably affects our estimations and if so how. It 
would represent much greater concern if we were to analyze differences in genuine 
income levels rather than differences in genuine income growth. In any case, given the 
lack of data on other items of natural capital, there is nothing that could be done about it 
at this stage. 
14 Note that this difference is not simply due to most countries in the upper panel being 
developing countries and most countries in the lower panel being developed ones. 
Australia and Canada, two classic examples of developed countries with a substantial 
primary commodity sector (RESOURCE70 is .1 for both countries), also have slightly 
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higher genuine income than GDP growth (Australia: 1.69 versus 1.66; Canada: 1.92 
versus 1.79). 
15 World Bank lending to Chad for the development of an oil pipeline is an example 
where the Bank has at least tried to pressure the lending government into using parts of 
the funds in a non-corrupt, transparent way that is beneficial to health care and rural 
development. 
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Table 1. The difference between net price method and El Serafy method 
 
n / r  1% 2% 3% 4% 5%  10% 
5 5.80  11.20 16.25  20.97 25.38 43.55
10  10.37 19.57 27.76 35.04 41.53 64.95
15  14.72 27.16 37.68 46.61 54.19 78.24
20  18.86 34.02 46.25 56.12 64.11 86.49
30  26.54 45.88 60.00 70.35 77.96 94.79
50  39.80 63.58 77.85 86.47 91.69 99.23
100 63.39 86.47 94.95 98.10 99.28 99.99
 
Note: Table shows difference between net price method (equation (2)) and El Serafy 
method (equation (3)) for a value of $100 according to equation (2). n is the number of 
remaining years of the resource stock and r is the discount rate. 
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Table 2. Change in average resource prices over the period 1970 to 1998 (Index 1970 
= 100) 
 
 1970  1980 1990 1998
bauxite 100  134.55 95.40 55.86
copper 100  82.79 66.22 34.77
gold 100  859.97 355.09 228.61
hard coal  100  222.59 147.10 104.59
iron ore  100  104.86 76.86 62.82
lead 100  136.58 95.60 80.41
lignite 100  222.72 147.18 104.13
natural gas  100  211.08 120.04 76.65
nickel 100  118.27 104.60 46.06
oil 100  885.74 367.19 173.84
phosphate rock  100  197.24 122.53 106.64
silver 100  586.43 90.61 87.27
tin 100  231.16 56.60 42.07
zinc 100  123.34 162.27 92.55
 
Source: World Bank (2003), converted into 1985 prices with the help of the US GDP 
deflator, taken from World Bank (2001). 
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Table 3. Estimation results (absolute t-values in parentheses) 
 
                      (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)




















LGDP70  0.078  -0.542  -0.813  -0.855  -0.843       
       
                   
               
                   
                   
            
             
              
                   
              
               
                
                
                    
             
            
                     
  (0.46)  (2.94)**  (3.92)**  (3.75)**  (3.66)**
LGENINC70  -0.001 -0.614 -0.879 -0.912 -0.896
  (0.01) (3.26)** (4.14)** (3.92)** (3.83)**
RESOURCE70  -5.576 -4.107 -3.502 -5.262 -5.383 -5.048 -3.630 -3.061 -5.060 -5.206






(2.84)** (2.34)* (2.01)* (2.96)** (3.02)**
OPEN7090  2.206 1.979 1.596 1.594 2.159 1.931 1.551 1.549




(5.49)** (4.91)** (3.17)** (3.16)**
LINV7098  0.773 0.726 0.755 0.750 0.706 0.741
  (2.55)* (2.31)* (2.37)*
 
(2.46)* (2.24)* (2.31)*
RULE8295  0.063 0.051 0.052 0.037
















(1.32) (4.04)** (4.34)** (4.40)** (4.23)**
Observations 86 86 86 79 79 86 86 86 79 79
R-squared 0.12 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.09 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.41
 
*  significant .05 level  ** at .01 level. 
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Table 4. Tests of equality for coefficients of the natural resource-intensity variable 
 
Regression:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Non-standardized coefficients: 
Dep. Var.: GROWTH7098  -5.576 -4.107 -3.502 -5.262 -5.383 
Dep. Var.: GENGROWTH7098 -5.048 -3.630 -3.061 -5.060 -5.206 
χ












Standardized beta coefficients: 
Dep. Var.: GROWTH7098  -.335 -.247 -.210 -.299 -.306 
Dep. Var.: GENGROWTH7098  -.307 -.221 -.186 -.291 -.299 
χ
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(2) – (3) 
Guyana 0.51  0.183  0.185  -0.001 
Mauritania 0.41  1.228  0.449  0.779 
Gambia 0.36  0.370  0.387  -0.017 
Mauritius 0.29  4.042  4.024  0.018 
Ivory Coast  0.29  -0.376  -0.290  -0.087 
Uganda 0.27  0.284  0.275  0.009 
Venezuela 0.24  -2.185  -2.057  -0.128 
Honduras 0.23  0.768  0.746  0.022 
Malawi 0.21  0.974  0.978  -0.004 
Ghana 0.21 -0.564 -0.566  0.002 
Average:   0.472  0.413  0.059 
        
Korea (Rep.)  0.02  5.332  5.410  -0.079 
China 0.02 3.845 3.792  0.053 
India 0.02  2.448  2.410  0.038 
Italy 0.02  2.215  2.393  -0.178 
Mexico 0.02  0.495  0.599  -0.104 
Germany 0.02  1.640  1.650  -0.009 
Switzerland 0.02  0.753  1.213 -0.461 
Japan 0.01 2.707 3.172  -0.464 
United States  0.01  1.895  1.910  -0.015 
Bangladesh 0.01  -0.641  -0.650 0.008 
Average:   2.069  2.190 -0.121 
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APPENDIX 1: DERIVATION OF USER COSTS ACCORDING TO 
THE EL SERAFY METHOD 
The formula for computing user costs according to the El Serafy method can be derived as 
follows: Let P be the resource price, AC average extraction cost, R the amount of resource 
extracted, r the discount rate and n the number of remaining years of the resource stock if 
extraction was the same in the future as in the base year, i.e. n is the static reserves to 
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APPENDIX 2: VARIABLE DEFINITION AND SOURCES OF DATA 
 
  LGDP70: Natural log of real purchasing power parity adjusted GDP in 1970 divided by 
the economically-active population in 1970. Economically active population is defined as 
population aged 15 to 64. GDP is converted into 1985 prices with the help of the US GDP 
deflator (Sachs and Warner’s (1997) original analysis is in 1985 prices). Source: Heston, 
Summers and Aten (2002) for GDP (rgdpch series), World Bank (2001) for population 
data and the US GDP deflator. 
  LGENINC70: Natural log of real purchasing power parity adjusted genuine income in 
1970 divided by the economically-active population in 1970. Economically active 
population is defined as population aged 15 to 64. Genuine income is defined as GDP 
minus depreciation of produced and natural capital stocks. Data for depreciation of 
produced capital are originally derived from United Nations Statistics Division. 
Depreciation of natural capital covers oil, gas, coal, bauxite, copper, iron ore, lead, nickel, 
phosphate rock, tin, zinc, gold and silver and is computed according to net price method 
(see text for details). Both GDP and depreciation data converted into 1985 prices with the 
help of the US GDP deflator. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) for GDP (rgdpch 
series), World Bank (2001) for population data and the US GDP deflator and World Bank 
(2003) for depreciation data. 
  GROWTH7098: Real per capita GDP growth rate per annum computed as 
100*(1/28)*(LGDP98-LGDP70), where LGDP98 is defined as LGDP70, but for 1998. 
Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
  GENGROWTH7098: Real per capita genuine income growth rate per annum computed as 
100*(1/28)*(LGENINC98-LGENINC70), where LGENINC98 is defined as LGENINC70, 
but for 1998. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) and World Bank (2003). 
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  RESOURCE70: Share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970. Primary products 
cover agricultural, mineral and fuel products. Source: Sachs and Warner (1997) who 
derive their data from World Bank: World Data 1995 CD-Rom. Sachs and Warner make a 
number of amendments to this variable, see Sachs and Warner (1997, p. 29) for details. 
  OPEN7090: Fraction of years a country is rated as an open economy during the period 
1970 to 1990. Source: Sachs and Warner (1995b). 
  LINV7098: Natural log of real gross domestic investment to real GDP, averaged over the 
period 1970 to 1998. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) (rgdpl series). 
  RULE8295: An index of the quality of the rule of law, averaged over the period 1982 to 
1995. The index runs on a 0 (worst) to 6 (best) scale and is defined as ‘respect for law and 
order, predictability and effectiveness of the judiciary system, enforceability of contracts’. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide, published by Political Risk Services 
(www.icrgonline.com). 
  TTGROWTH7098: Average annual growth in the log of the external terms of trade 
between 1970 and 1998. It is computed as 100*(1/28)*(ln(TT1998)-ln(TT1970)), where 
TT means terms of trade and is defined as the ratio of an export price index to an import 
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